IKAR (the Russian Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis) is an institution that monitors sociological developments in Russia and analyzes Russian media and social media posts. Its latest report focuses on a measure so unpopular that the Kremlin has not implemented it again since 2022: mobilization. Why does Russia need a new mobilization? How will it be carried out? IKAR Director Dr. Oleksandr Shulga answers these and other questions.
Mobilization is not popular in Russia, but now that contract-based conscription is on the decline, it seems clear that it will take place. To what extent is mobilization unpopular?
According to our sociological research, mobilization is viewed very negatively by Russian society. This was already the case in 2023 and in subsequent years, but now there is virtually no difference in the level of opposition among different age groups, nor between those living in large cities and those in rural areas. Previously, those over 55 were in favor of mobilization, while the vast majority of young people who could be mobilized were against it.
Overall, opposition to mobilization stands at around 75 percent, while support has fallen from 24 percent in early 2023 to just 11 percent today.
It’s curious that older people—who cannot be mobilized and have a more Soviet mindset—are also opposed to mobilization.
Older generations have been more supportive of the war, but like the rest of the Russians, they have relatives who have been killed or wounded. Therefore, Russians are aware that if they or their acquaintances are mobilized, the chances of dying are very high.
Russians are not willing to participate in this war for free; they are not motivated by patriotism, and those who have enlisted have done so for money or to get out of prison, and then there are the foreigners who enlist to obtain Russian citizenship. The system in Russia has promoted this “mercenary model” of high salaries and social benefits.
One of the key points highlighted in the report is the lack of an ideological justification for the war. It seems that defeating “Nazism,” emulating the “heroes of the Great Patriotic War,” and beating NATO do not convince Russians.
Yes, there is a lack of ideological motivation, such as patriotism, and there is no clear vision of what victory will look like. If you enlist solely for the money, you want to enjoy that money, and that depends on how long you spend on the front lines, because your chances of survival decrease the longer you’re mobilized. For example, “Wagner” offered very clear terms of service to the prisoners it recruited: survive six months, and your sentence will be pardoned, and you’ll be a free man. However, after Prigozhin’s death, the Ministry of Defense took over and changed the contract, and there are no longer any time limits. For those who enlist—whether they are prisoners or not—the contract is indefinite until the war ends. What good are two or three million rubles if you’re killed on the battlefield?
Russian advances on the front lines are being paid for with the lives of their soldiers in cannon-fodder assaults, and the chain of command does not care about the survival of its own troops. Lives are being traded for square meters, and more and more Russians are becoming aware of this. That is why the system has failed, and Putin urgently needs new soldiers.
However, there have been no further mobilizations since the first one in 2022.
Mobilization is a red line—I’d say the last one—and that’s why the Kremlin has resisted repeating it since 2022 and is weighing its actions very carefully. Over the years, they have used various incentives to attract recruits: money, citizenship, or freedom. In addition, many conscripts performing military service have been “pushed” to sign a contract, as have many reservists.
Since 2023, the government has employed three new recruitment tools. First, companies are now required—under penalty of severe fines—to inform the Ministry of Defense which employees are suitable for recruitment. Private “recruitment agencies” have also been created; these serve as intermediaries with the government and receive payment for each new contract signed. Payments to these agencies have multiplied since 2025, indicating that their activities are widespread. Finally, universities serve as another source for recruiting high-caliber personnel.
And what kind of mobilization might take place?
In our report, we outline two possibilities: mass mobilization or “hybrid” mobilization. We believe the latter is much more likely. This makes sense from Putin’s perspective, as he has stated in his latest interviews and statements that he is ready for an endless war in which Russia will ultimately prevail because it has more resources, more people, and greater resolve.
This “hybrid” mobilization will consist of an increase in quotas for each region, and it will be up to each regional government to determine how to meet that increase. If a region meets its quota—whether because it has the funds to incentivize recruitment or because there are enough foreigners or prisoners to recruit—it will not be necessary to mobilize anyone; otherwise, it will have to do so. The Kremlin thus shifts all responsibility and potential negative consequences onto regional authorities. The goal is to reach approximately 300,000 new recruits within a year.
Will we witness scenes like those from 2022, with thousands of Russians fleeing their country?
Russia has prepared very well for the new wave of mobilization and has learned the lessons from the previous one. To prevent a mass exodus like the one in 2022, the authorities have created a database of potential conscripts, and anyone on that list is barred from leaving the country—whether from within Russia or from Belarus, which many Russians used as a “back door.” In addition, recruitment offices have been set up at border crossings with Georgia and Kazakhstan to detain anyone attempting to escape, as happened in 2022.
The Ministry of Defense has greatly improved its IT capabilities and maintains a detailed registry of future “recruits” and their families. Since 2024, it has also expanded its digital control over domestic flight, train, and bus routes, in addition to measures that link your cell phone to your passport and other tracking methods. This will make it easier to geolocate each recruit in the event they change their place of residence or flee to another region of Russia.
In 2022, mobilization was significantly higher in Russia’s poorest regions than in Moscow or St. Petersburg. Do you think that will be the case again?
Yes, I think the mobilization will be concentrated in rural areas and small towns, but it will have very little impact on Moscow or St. Petersburg. In general, mobilization in large cities will target vulnerable groups, such as marginalized people or those from the lowest socioeconomic class.
And this will happen after the Russian “elections.”
Of course, they won’t start before the so-called elections, but all the preparatory work has already been done. We’ve already seen cases where the authorities have been given free rein to meet their recruitment quotas, and after the elections we’ll see how all of that escalates.
This time they’re being smarter.
Yes. The reason they aren’t announcing a massive, concentrated mobilization is to avoid backlash from Russian society and, at the same time, because it would undermine all of Russia’s propaganda and the concept of the “special military operation.” All these years they’ve been repeating that they’re winning and that Ukraine is weak and forced to carry out compulsory mobilization—arresting people on the street and sending them to the front—so why are we doing the same thing? It would be an admission that they aren’t winning and that their propaganda is a lie.
Ukraine has been carrying out a campaign against Russian companies such as Wildberries and Ozon. What is your opinion on this campaign?
This campaign has several dimensions. On the one hand, it shows Russians that the war is here and that they are not safe—it is not a colonial war taking place on another continent; it is on their border and is affecting their territory. On the other hand, it shows that the war affects their daily lives and that every aspect of their civilized existence could come to an end. Finally, it also demonstrates to Russians our capabilities—that we can destroy their power plants and make them feel what we felt last winter.
Furthermore, this also affects small and medium-sized Russian businesses, just as attacks on refineries and ports are hitting all sectors of the Russian economy. Thus, the war’s costs outweigh any potential benefits, making it irrational for anyone—except Putin—to continue waging this war. The entire population is paying the price because one person refuses to stop.
This campaign has ideological, psychological, economic, and financial aspects. I believe it was a good decision and that Ukraine will continue with the campaign. Our goal is not to occupy Russia, but to make them understand that this war is not a one-sided game—it can be waged by both sides. That everything they have done to Ukraine can be done to them in return, and that they should consider whether that is what they want for themselves.
