Romania is currently experiencing the longest period in its recent history without a government possessing full powers – 150 days since Parliament passed a vote of no confidence in the government’s program, the ministerial cabinet, and the dismissed Prime Minister, Ilie Bolojan.
The no-confidence motion, which took place on May 5, 2026, was primarily supported by the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD), along with several smaller parliamentary groups. The motion passed in Parliament with a record number of votes in favor of dismissal, specifically 281 out of a total of 465. There were numerous well-founded reasons for dismissing the government formed by the National Liberal Party (PNL), the Save Romania Union (USR), the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), and the PSD.
On one hand, the composition of the prime minister’s cabinet raised concerns from the very first months, as it included five deputy prime ministers at a time when the government was citing the need for austerity and a reduction in the number of civil servants. One of these deputy prime ministers, Dragoș Anastasiu, resigned following a scandal involving the National Agency for Fiscal Administration (ANAF), during which he introduced the phrase “survival bribe” to describe the sums he had transferred. Additionally, Defense Minister Ionuț Moșteanu (USR) resigned after discrepancies were found between his academic record and the résumés he had submitted to various institutions – he had “mixed up” the university from which he had graduated and listed the name of a different university on his résumé.
The poor quality of the decision-making circle within Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan’s cabinet is also confirmed by the catastrophic economic situation into which Romania has been plunged over the past year: a first analysis of the indicators reveals a dramatic increase in public debt, rampant inflation (the highest in the EU), sky-high interest rates on foreign loans, a decline in foreign investment, a drop in industrial production and services, and an unprecedented rise in energy prices. In addition to all these issues, which are immediately and painfully reflected in the population’s already low standard of living, the Bolojan government has “achieved the milestone” of eliminating free health insurance for parents on parental leave (amid an acute demographic crisis and in contrast to pro-birth measures in other EU countries), the loss of free coverage in the public health system for the unemployed, cuts to educational scholarships, the failure to index pensions, the non-payment of the first day of sick leave, and, unfortunately, the list could go on.
Following the prime minister’s dismissal, President Nicușor Dan, in his characteristic style of postponing answers, made his first technocratic nomination following informal consultations at the Cotroceni Palace with the “frequentable” parties – Eugen Tomac. At the time of the proposal, he held the position of honorary advisor for relations with Romanians worldwide at the Presidential Administration. The appointment of a technocrat raised the issue of accountability to the people from the very beginning, especially since Eugen Tomac has a background that is way more political than apolitical: a close associate of former President Traian Băsescu, he has led the People’s Movement Party (PMP) on several occasions from 2013 to the present (maybe the results of the 2024 parliamentary elections recommended him for the leadership of the executive branch—the party received approximately 2% of the vote). The label “presidential government” was applied to the initial cabinet of ministers because the prime minister and three ministers were reportedly drawn directly from Nicușor Dan’s team of advisors. Unfortunately, the parliamentary vote of confidence did not take place because on the morning of Sunday, June 14, Eugen Tomac withdrew his candidacy for the office of prime minister.
President Dan’s second defeat came following the nomination of Adrian Veștea as the next prime minister. The nomination sparked controversy because the first vice president of the PNL was appointed without consulting his party’s leadership, which caused a split within the party and thus constituted major interference by the president in the party’s operations—an act punishable by suspension. The possibility of Adrian Veștea assuming the office of prime minister came to a quick end one week after his nomination, when Parliament held a vote of (no)confidence. The result was 189 votes in favor of the PNL-USR-UDMR governing coalition, falling short of the required 233 votes.
After another three months of delays, President Dan, in his typical “firefighter” manner, appointed a third person to the role of prime minister: Siegfried Mureșan (or Siegfried Vasile Mureșan, as some political opponents insist—with slightly malicious precision—on identifying him by his full name), with the coalition consisting of the PNL, USR, and UDMR.
Siegfried Mureșan’s political and professional background is closely aligned with Romania’s liberal parties. He was mentored by Gunther Krichbaum (which also suggests an affinity with the Merz government’s agenda) and has enjoyed an unexpectedly rapid rise in European politics. Supported by a German government scholarship, he was assigned as an intern to Gunther Krichbaum’s parliamentary office, then served as an advisor for several years, and was subsequently seconded to the European Parliament’s administrative services (at the time, Gunther Krichbaum served as chair of the Bundestag’s Committee on European Affairs). Currently, Siegfried Mureșan is vice president of the European People’s Party —a party whose president, Manfred Weber, sent a letter to the European Commission requesting that PNRR funds totaling 770 million euros should be blocked if Bucharest does not abandon its plans to amend the law, which could result in USR leader Dominic Fritz being barred from serving as mayor.
N.B.: Gunther Krichbaum also took a series of positions that were, to say the least, confrontational toward the Romanian authorities and even considered invoking the procedure under Article 7 of the TEU.
The parliamentary committees did not give the cabinet a favorable assessment: of the 16 ministers, only half received a favorable opinion. It is worth noting that 10 of the 16 proposed ministers had been part of the dismissed Ilie Bolojan government; thus, 10 dismissed ministers appeared before the committees to be reappointed to their posts. Furthermore, just as in the previously dismissed executive branch, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Economy, and the Ministry of the Environment (5 out of 16 ministries), all of which are institutions of the utmost national importance, are assigned to the USR (which has frequently faced accusations of failing to pursue the national interest), with a parliamentary share of 12%, equivalent to 6% of the total electorate based on attendance at the last parliamentary election.
President Dan, together with the current governing coalition, continues to persist in its mistakes: Eugen Tomac, Adrian Veștea, and Siegfried Mureșan have all strongly advocated for maintaining the governing program of the dismissed Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan, even though its results have been disastrous for Romania, and an overwhelming majority of 76.5% of Romanians believe the country is heading in the wrong direction. Furthermore, five months after his dismissal, the Bolojan government is still in office, and the constitutional limits on a dismissed government do not seem to pose any problem. Thus, by keeping the dismissed prime minister in office and continuing the “reforms,” those mentioned above are effectively nullifying the parliamentary elections, less than two years after the presidential elections were annulled.
The vote in Parliament that took place on September 30 marked the third failure for President Dan and the PNL-USR-UDMR coalition. As expected, the total number of votes was 182 (even fewer than the second proposal, which failed to meet the threshold), falling short of the minimum threshold of 233 required to invest the government. The coalition, which had 170 MPs, managed to convince only 12 additional MPs to support it—most likely from minority groups—since AUR members were not present at the time of the vote and the PSD members were present but did not vote this government.
Normally, in a democratic society with European values, the solution is crystal clear. Democracy has its own self-regulating mechanisms—the inability to form a governing coalition leads to a return to the will of the people, and thus to snap elections. This is by no means an unprecedented situation in the democratic world; most EU member states have held early elections when necessary. The problem in Romania’s case arises from an abuse of the spirit of the Constitution, perpetrated by none other than one of its central figures, the President.
In a recent press statement, President Dan clearly stated that he does not want such a scenario, going so far as to say that “early elections are bad, first and foremost, for the citizens”—in other words, the democratic expression of the people’s will is bad precisely for the voters, and this scenario of unstable and decadent equilibrium is preferable. In June 2026, the President stated that “I would like us to avoid this scenario because it will not bring about, at least judging by the polls, any fundamental shifts in the majorities.” Following the same logic, it does not matter that we cannot form a stable government during a difficult period marked by intense international dynamics; we can base our decisions on the polls, which will determine the parliamentary distribution even for the regular elections in 2028—thereby reducing election expenses as well. Unfortunately, the mediator between the branches of government, “as well as between the state and society” categorically refuses to restore the fundamental right of Romanian citizens to elect their representatives to Parliament.
All these problems originate from the disregard for a significant segment of public opinion, the establishing of a cordon sanitaire against the second-largest parliamentary party which, simultaneously, leads in voter intent (speaking of polls)—and the fear of Romania’s decision-makers to return to the people.
