Clément Molin is a French analyst specializing in open-source intelligence and a student of international relations at the Catholic University of Lille. His X account, with more than 130,000 followers, is one of the best places to follow what is happening in Ukraine.
How do you assess the fifth year of the war in Ukraine? Is the Russian military, as Putin claims, closer to victory?
Since 2023, Ukraine has been in a precarious position on the front lines, especially after the fall of Avdiivka in 2024, but this year is going much better. Of course, there are always many people repeating the narrative that Russia is winning because it is advancing in some areas of the Donbas, such as around Kramatorsk, Konstantinivka, or Dobropilia, but at the same time, they have been held back on many other fronts and have even been forced to retreat in Zaporizhzhia, Prokrovsk, or right now in Liman. Russia continues its infiltrations north of Kharkiv.
What is the state of the Russian military? Are they losing ground compared to previous years? If you look at the numbers, the Russian military has captured only 650 km² this year, compared to 3,146 km² during the same period in 2025 and 1,907 km² in 2024. This year is turning out to be very bad for Russia: they are losing a lot of men, and the replacements they are recruiting are not enough to make up for the casualties. For that reason, they are concentrating their efforts between Dobropilia and Druzhivka, where four Russian armies are trying to overcome the resistance of the 1st Azov Corps.
On September 15, General Biletskyi announced an offensive operation, “Vivaldi,” which has dealt a significant defeat to Russian forces in Liman. However, many Western media outlets are alternating between inconsistent reports, portraying Ukraine as either defeated or victorious regardless of—as in this case—what is actually happening on the front lines.
This happens because the war has become boring to the public. No one is interested in knowing which city has fallen or where the fighting is taking place. So they opt for sensationalist stories. Furthermore, a strongly pro-Ukrainian narrative appeals to one audience, while a pro-Russian one appeals to another. Many military analysts and bloggers do this as well, choosing to ignore certain facts in order to sell a narrative.
Earlier, you mentioned the high number of Russian casualties. Do you think there will be a mobilization? Could that mobilization alter the course of the war?
I think there will be a mobilization at some point because there are fewer and fewer recruits, and they have to pay much more money to attract new volunteers. It’s very expensive and also causes an economic problem. If Russia wants to launch an offensive in the spring, it needs a lot of men to protect the battered logistics in the rearguard and, at the same time, to replace casualties on the front lines. Once the elections are over, I believe this mobilization will take place; although we won’t see its effects until 2027, it could put greater pressure on Ukrainian defenses.
Ukraine also needs to mobilize more soldiers. Can we say that, just as it is for Russia, mobilization is the biggest problem for Ukraine?
Yes, and honestly, the Ukrainians don’t have many options. There are many soldiers who have been on the front lines for years and need to return home, and many young people who might leave the country if they are mobilized. To address this problem, Ukraine is turning to technology—using more drones and even robots—and recruiting more foreign soldiers, especially from South America, but I don’t think this will be enough.
What do you think of Ukraine’s campaign against Wildberries and Ozon? Has it been effective?
I’m not sure. The offensive against refineries has been effective—Ukraine has been doing this for years and it works, whereas Russia can’t do the same. The recent attack on Moscow is the seventh attack on a Russian refinery this month and the 91st since the beginning of the year. This is straining Russia’s refining capacity and exacerbating fuel shortages. For this reason, these attacks—like those targeting the military industry and air bases—are proving very effective. The attacks on Wildberries and Ozon require a lot of drones and can have economic consequences, but they should have taken into account what the Russian response might be. The lack of air defense became even more evident last month, when Russia struck 145 warehouses—five or six times more than Ukraine. In other words, the operation has caused more harm than good. I think it’s a political operation that didn’t properly calculate the consequences.
That lack of air defense systems, combined with improvements to the Russian Geran 4—a jet-powered drone—points to a very difficult winter for Ukraine.
Indeed, it will be a more difficult winter because Russia is going to launch more intense attacks on the energy sector—with the resulting consequences for the civilian population and the economy—and it is going to launch more missiles. It is a very dangerous situation, and we will see if Russia manages to overwhelm Ukraine’s air defense systems.
At the same time, Russia is waging a campaign against NATO countries: drones, acts of sabotage, provocations, etc.
Russia is at war with NATO. They know we won’t do anything to respond to their provocations and that we’ll limit ourselves to helping Ukraine—nothing more. So they can sabotage our infrastructure or attack with their drones, and they’re doing so on a regular basis. This is very concerning, especially since there’s no response from politicians and the list of acts of sabotage is getting longer and longer. However, our politicians only talk about hybrid threats, unclaimed acts, and appeasement.
Could this Russian campaign of harassment ultimately provoke a reaction from NATO?
Russia has been playing this game for years: it takes an action, waits for a reaction, and, if nothing happens, takes it a step further. This was the case with Georgia, with Ukraine in 2014, and again in 2022—though this time it backfired, because there was an unexpected outpouring of support for Ukraine. It’s a dangerous game, and one day it could backfire on them.
If a conflict were to break out, can we count on the United States’ support?
I believe that with Trump at the helm, we cannot count on the United States to come to Europe’s defense. The latest polls show that trust in the United States among citizens of Central and Eastern Europe is steadily declining. Previously, low levels of trust were concentrated in the westernmost regions, but now mistrust is widespread.
A few days ago, Radosław Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister, stated that in the event of war, Poland would easily defeat Russia. Poland has rearmed, but it has never fought a war like the one currently being waged in Ukraine.
Exactly. I don’t think Poland—or any other European country—is truly prepared for this kind of war, despite having a large army, and its chances of defeating Russia could diminish drastically in the face of the first massive waves of drones.
