First published in https://misao.hr/rat-se-mijenja-ukrajina-drzi-karte/
I remember that when the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the media was full of experts predicting a Russian victory within days or weeks. Many of them were retired military officers convinced of the military superiority of the world’s second-strongest army, who argued that the Russian army was following the manual on how to win a war to the letter. However, Russian setbacks began very soon, with the failure of Russian paratroopers to secure the capture of Hostomel airport, on the outskirts of Kyiv, and the resolute resistance of Ukrainian troops, the most heroic example of which was the defence of Azovstal in Mariupol – a development that contradicted the reports of mass surrenders being broadcast by channels such as Russia Today.
The long columns of Russian tanks, which seemed unbeatable, became bogged down and the ‘blitzkrieg’ on Kyiv failed, forcing the Russians in April to focus their efforts on the Donbas. Despite everything, the narrative remained unchanged: Russia was still invincible and it was only a matter of time before Ukraine surrendered. In May, I was invited onto a television programme in which several experts, including a former military officer, claimed that the best thing Ukraine could do was to accept Putin’s demands. My view was diametrically opposed: the special military operation had failed, Russian weapons were inferior to Western ones, and soldiers in the world’s second-best army were carrying first-aid kits from the 1970s, which drastically increased the number of wounded who died before reaching a field hospital. A year later, they made another programme, but this time I wasn’t invited.
The liberation of Kherson, the only capital city that had been occupied, and the expulsion of Russian forces from Kharkiv, demonstrated Ukraine’s ability to deal blows to the Russians and not merely adopt a defensive role. The determination and courage of Ukrainian soldiers, combined with the superiority of Western weaponry, were indeed making a difference. “Russia missed the boat on what was known as the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) because the IT boom caught the Kremlin off guard following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and it was crippled by the ‘Star Wars’ competition with Reagan and the defeat in Afghanistan,” notes retired Admiral Juan Rodríguez Garat. “Russia split its defence budget ten ways and remained in that state for fifteen years, which has led to a clear technological lag – and not just in weapons systems. None of those who today never stop praising Russian weaponry would buy a Russian computer, a Russian television or a Russian mobile phone. We all know that, until the invasion began, Aeroflot flew Airbus and Boeing aircraft. Furthermore, there is evidence to be found in the performance of Soviet- and later Russian-made equipment in the conflicts in the Middle East. I remember my astonishment, when I was a lieutenant in the navy, at the fact that the Russian anti-aircraft missiles in the Bekaa Valley had been destroyed by Israeli aircraft without a single casualty. And it has happened again now with the S-300s and Israeli missiles. The difference in equipment is all the more noticeable the more electronics there are in the aircraft, and Russian weaponry lags far behind its Western counterparts and even behind equipment manufactured by the Ukrainian industry.”
Following Ukraine’s victories, the war has entered a new phase: a war of attrition in which Russia has incurred enormous expenditure of material and human resources, in exchange for territorial gains that are becoming increasingly limited as the drone war evolves. “Russia has adapted its strategy towards a model based on constant pressure. It combines the intensive use of artillery with deep strikes against critical infrastructure. Russian doctrine has prioritised firepower over precision, seeking to progressively wear down Ukrainian capabilities,” Colonel Carlos de Antonio Alcázar, an analyst at the Institute for the Global Common Good at Francisco de Vitoria University, tells me, “however, this approach has entailed very high costs. Losses of modern equipment have forced a reliance on legacy Soviet-era equipment, whilst human casualties have necessitated successive partial mobilisations and adjustments to the force structure. This attrition has generated internal tensions and has shaped the evolution of the Russian economy towards a war economy model.”
Russia has been able to bear the cost of this war of attrition – we are talking about around one and a half million casualties – through partial conscription, the use of prisoners and the payment of exorbitant sums to volunteers. This tactic has enabled the Kremlin to meet its quota of cannon fodder, at least until now, when the number of casualties exceeds that of new recruits: 80,000 new soldiers were recruited in the first quarter of 2026, but during the same period, the Russian army suffered 105,000 casualties. However, purely as a matter of numbers, Ukraine could not face this war of attrition in the same way. “Ukraine has developed an asymmetric approach based on flexibility, continuous adaptation and innovation. The integration of Western systems, such as precision artillery and advanced air defence, has been combined with home-grown solutions, particularly in the field of drones, which has enabled operational cohesion to be maintained despite inferior equipment,” notes Alcázar.
The drone war
“Drones are not merely a technological innovation, but a transformative element in the art of war. Through their mass production, continuous innovation and tactical integration, Ukraine has managed to partially offset its structural disadvantages vis-à-vis Russia,” concludes Alcázar.
Drones have changed everything and, at present, more than 70 per cent of casualties on the Ukrainian front are caused by drones, whereas previously they were mainly caused by artillery and aircraft. But their reach is not limited to the front line, and whilst Russia is using missiles and drones against Ukrainian infrastructure and cities, Ukraine is waging an asymmetric war against Russia, attacking refineries and economic targets that are undermining its military capability. Russian oil production has fallen by up to 400,000 barrels a day, and ports such as Novorossiysk on the Black Sea and Ust-Luga on the Baltic have seen their capacity reduced by 38 per cent and 43 per cent respectively.
We are talking about Ukraine having struck at least 24 of Russia’s 33 main refineries, leading to petrol and diesel shortages in 53 regions, from Crimea to Vladivostok, causing long queues at petrol stations, restrictions on fuel sales and even rationing. On 8 July, Russia banned the export of diesel, a move that has pushed up its price by up to 19 per cent and doubled inflation in some sectors. Russia has gone from being the ‘world’s petrol station’ to being forced to import fuel.
In addition to these ‘far-reaching sanctions’ – as Zelenskyy refers to these attacks – the drones are also undermining the morale of the Russian population. Damaging Putin’s image, portraying him to his people as an incompetent leader, has been a very clear objective of Ukraine since the first incursions into Russian territory by units of Russian volunteers fighting for Ukraine, such as the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) or the Free Russian Legion. Apart from other considerations, the operation in Kursk also served the same purpose and, for the first time, sparked harsh criticism of the Kremlin on Russian social media.
Images of the huge plumes of smoke over St Petersburg and Moscow have spread across Russia and belied the propaganda claims. Weariness at a victory that never comes, fuel restrictions and social media controls have led to the Russian president’s lowest approval ratings since the start of the war. According to polls by IKAR, the Russian Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis, in Krasnodar and Rostov, Putin’s popularity stands at around 35 per cent, falling to 16 per cent among young people under 30 in Rostov and 24 per cent in Krasnodar. “Putin’s popularity will continue to fall unless he ends the war, something for which he is obviously not prepared as it would be seen as a sign of weakness,” says Oleksandr Shulga, director of IKAR.
Thanks to drones and Ukrainian capabilities, the tide is turning. “It seems that this strategy is working and that it could turn the tide of the campaign in the fourth year of the war,” notes retired Marine Corps Colonel Juan Ángel López, who also highlights among Ukraine’s achievements the defeat of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, which has forced it to seek safer ports. The image of Vladimir Putin with a handful of sailors on ‘Russian Navy Day’, standing in front of a huge poster depicting a submarine, is the clearest evidence of the fear of Ukrainian drones. How far this same celebration seems now from three years ago, in 2023, when Putin reviewed three thousand sailors on motorboats, ships and submarines, whilst threatening NATO and the United States.
For López, drones have brought about a military revolution akin to that brought about by the Spanish tercios in the Early Modern period: “Drones represent a systemic shift in the conduct of warfare equivalent to that brought about by the tercios in the 16th century. And for this reason, modern armies should create their own 21st-century tercios by integrating drones into every infantry formation right down to the lowest level,” something the Ukrainians are already doing. “It is a military revolution. What once required regiments and airstrips now fits into a rucksack. What once demanded courage now requires only bandwidth. We cannot wait for the next war to write the doctrine. It is already being written in the skies over Ukraine,” concludes.
In the face of this revolution, old tactics are no longer effective, as the Russian army discovered, once again, on 24 July. Russian forces attempted an armoured offensive and massed dozens of main battle tanks, including T-72B3s equipped with the Arena-M active protection system (APS) (designed to counter modern anti-tank threats, such as FPV drones), and armoured vehicles near Dobropillia, in the Donetsk region. The attack aimed to break through the front line, but was thwarted by Ukrainian drone operators who reduced the Russian armoured vehicles to scrap in a matter of minutes: 9 main battle tanks, 2 armoured vehicles and 3 Grad rocket launchers were destroyed, along with several dozen soldiers.
On 28 February 2025, the disastrous meeting took place at the White House in which Donald Trump told Zelensky that he did not hold the cards, and many rubbed their hands with glee, believing that Ukraine had lost its greatest ally and would be forced to capitulate. This has not been the case, and we now know that Ukrainian Defence Drones (UDD), the US company representing the Ukrainian drone manufacturer ‘F-Drones’, is set to establish its first large-scale assembly and manufacturing centre in Ohio, in the United States – a project involving an investment of $18.4 million and set to create at least 300 new American jobs – and that Ukraine has received authorisation from Trump to manufacture its own Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors.
What has changed? Everything – not only on the battlefields of Ukraine, but also in the Middle East, where the Ukrainians’ experience has become a benchmark for the defence of the Gulf states and also the United States in the face of Iranian attacks. “Ukraine has become a key player in generating military knowledge through its experience in real combat, and incorporating that Ukrainian knowledge is essential for NATO,” says Alcázar. Yes, Ukraine does hold the cards.
