Juras Zahorski is a Belarusian journalist and exile. For security reasons he does not use his real name.
What was your reason for leaving your country, Belarus?
I left Belarus for a combination of reasons. Before the political crisis of 2020, I worked as a journalist for a media outlet that the authorities declared illegal. In 2023–2024, the persecution extended even to former employees of independent media. The final trigger was that security service officers started looking for me: they tried to “invite me for a conversation” without explaining in what case and in what status. In Belarus, you can be arrested and sentenced for any criticism of the authorities — even for a comment, a like, or a repost of independent media content. In such a situation, the risk of ending up in prison after even a short “conversation” was extremely high. That’s why I decided to leave. The last months before my departure were especially hard psychologically: you live in constant stress and can’t even sleep normally anymore.
Has the repression in Belarus worsened as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine?
Yes, the repressions have indeed intensified. Despite the suppression of protests after 2020, with the start of the full-scale war, people once again began holding anti-war actions, speaking out on social media, and making donations. In Belarus, any public anti-war stance carries the risk of being detained. The most striking example is the Minsk Protestant church New Life. For its protest and anti-war position, it was deprived of its building and registration. For a year and a half, the congregation held Sunday services right on the street near the confiscated building, where prayers were offered for an end to Russian aggression. As a result, the church’s activity was banned, and its social media accounts were labeled “extremist.” Recently, the persecution of the anti-war stance has become institutionalized. In 2024–2025, the authorities carried out the re-registration of all religious communities under new laws. Now, people convicted under “political” articles cannot be founders of communities or serve in ministry.
The religious persecution of the Lukashenko regime is greater in the case of the Catholic Church, what is the situation of Catholics in Belarus?
Representatives of all denominations in Belarus face repressions. But although Catholics make up about 10% of the country’s population, Roman and Greek Catholics account for almost half of the known cases of persecution of priests and ministers — 40 out of 88. Most often these are administrative punishments — short terms of detention and fines — but there are also serious sentences. At least eight priests have either left the country or were expelled. The first striking example of repression against the Catholic Church was the ban on Archbishop Kаndrusiewich’s entry into Belarus in 2020 after he condemned the violence of the security forces. Although he was a Belarusian citizen, he was not allowed to return to the country, and Lukashenko accused the Catholic Church of “anti-state activity.” Some explain his rapid retirement as the result of government interference.
During the protests, ecumenical prayers for Belarus were held in Minsk’s “Red Church,” and people hid there during the crackdowns. As a result, parish priest Vladislau Zavalniuk and the parish were effectively pushed out of the church. The official reason was a fire in October 2022, but no details about it were published, so many believe it was a fabricated act of retaliation. The church is now closed “for reconstruction.” In 2024, Zavalnyuk was removed from the leadership of the parish. He himself said that he was sent on an “undeserved vacation by order from above — but not from the Pope.” It is believed that this was a demand of the secular authorities in exchange for returning the church to the believers. Father Vyacheslav Barok was repeatedly persecuted for his blog and participation in peaceful protests, and was therefore forced to leave. His social media accounts and videos were declared “extremist.” Among those repressed were also active lay believers. Ales Bialiatski, Nobel Prize laureate who is now in prison, was in the past a Catholic activist and founded Belarus’s most influential human rights organization Viasna. Vitold Ashurak, one of the first political prisoners who was tortured to death in prison, was also an active Catholic.
In 2022 the authorities banned the singing of a hymn in churches. Which hymn is it and why was it banned?
It is the Belarusian patriotic hymn “Mahutny Boža” (“Almighty God”). It was written during World War II by a Belarusian anti-soviet activist and became a spiritual anthem of Belarusians in the years of independence. It was often performed during church services, and until 2021 there was even a festival of sacred music in Belarus bearing its name. During the political crisis, “Mahutny Boža” became one of the protest anthems, and the head of the Orthodox Church of Belarus has banned singing this hymn in church.
Is the idea of the regime that the only true church is the Moscow Patriarchate?
I would rather say that this is a demand coming from Russia to the Lukashenko regime, rather than the Belarusian authorities’ own desire. Russian Orthodoxy is the dominant denomination in Belarus and is the most closely controlled by both Moscow and Minsk. The Russian Orthodox Church in Belarus acts as an organizer of actions providing humanitarian and ideological support for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine: it collects funds and participates in youth militarized camps promoting Russian narratives. Separately, in this context, one can mention the Minsk St. Elizabeth Convent — the largest center of Russian ideological influence through religion. For the authorities, the main factor is loyalty to Lukashenko’s and Russia’s policies. Although the Catholic Church is officially recognized as traditional, it is often perceived as a “Western influence” due to its connections with Poland. That is why actions against Western historical narratives also affect Catholics. For example, in 2022 a wave of destruction of Polish military graves from World War II began, and monuments and plaques honoring Catholic anti-russian figures or documenting the historical truth about communist terror were removed from some church territories.
Father Henrykh Akalatovich was sentenced on December 30 in Belarus to 11 years in prison for“high treason”. What do you know about this case?
From what is known from independent media, Father Henryk Akaltovich was detained on November 17, 2023, and sentenced to 11 years in a maximum-security colony on charges of “espionage for Poland and the Vatican,” which he calls a “blatant provocation.” He considers the trial political, refuses to participate in provocations against other Catholic hierarchs, continues to help prisoners of various denominations, and sees this as fulfilling the Gospel command to “visit those in prison.” While in detention, he suffered a heart attack and had previously undergone surgery for stomach cancer, which requires ongoing medical supervision. Father Andrzej Yukhnevich is also in prison, sentenced to 13 years. Initially, he was accused of military sabotage, but the case was later reclassified as “lewd acts with minors.” Human rights defenders report that he suffered torture. In prison, he was assigned a “low social status” — a category in the prison hierarchy that entails isolation and a risk of physical, psychological, and sexual violence from other inmates. Previously, he also provided spiritual support to other prisoners, but his low status has deprived him of this opportunity. Recently, another Polish Carmelite monk was detained, also accused of espionage.
What do you think about the recent release of 14 political prisoners, including opposition leader Sergey Tikhanovsky? Do you think it will change anything?
I view the release of political prisoners positively. First and foremost, the people themselves are valuable — they serve as examples of faith, principles, and action. It is especially joyful when those released are people I know personally. Overall, I see this as a sign of progress and change in Belarus. But I don’t think it should change our attitude toward the Lukashenko regime. Releases are a forced form of bargaining, usually for economic purposes, rather than a sign of repentance. For example, the 52 political prisoners recently released effectively became a “bargaining chip” in exchange for the lifting of sanctions on the state airline. People were simply exchanged for the ability to repair planes. As for the release of Tikhanovsky, it is difficult to predict what practical impact it—or other releases—might have on the situation. In 2020, he was an important activist, but now his role is mostly symbolic. Still, after some time, I think we will be able to draw conclusions.
What is your opinion about the Belarusian opposition?
The Belarusian opposition is a complex community with different structures and positions. Overall, I consider the existence of opposition organizations in the diaspora to be useful: it allows for a systematic dialogue with the West and the raising of Belarusian issues both inside the country and abroad. One could say that “Independent Belarus”, although it lacks territory, large funds, or an army, has a foreign ministry that functions far more effectively than the regime’s. A recent release of political prisoners, thanks to U.S. mediation, serves as confirmation of this. By comparison, the Russian diaspora lacks similar structures, so there is no one to advocate for their political prisoners.
