“For Putin, peace means war”: An interview with Maciej Pieczyński

Maciej Pieczyński holds a PhD in Literature and is a specialist in language and the Russian and Ukrainian socio-political situation. As a journalist and columnist for the weekly “Do Rzeczy” and the dorzeczy.pl portal, he deals with issues related to the East and is an expert on Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian media narrative. A researcher and professor at the Institute of Literature and New Media at the University of Szczecin, he is the author of several books, including “The Frontier of Propaganda. Lukashenko and Putin in the hybrid war with Poland”, and “There is no other Russia”.

Playwright Ivan Vyrypaev says that “the Russian first takes the axe, then the Gospel”. What is the real Russia? What is its society like?

The real Russia is exactly as Vyrypaev describes it. It intertwines, therefore, a great culture with a great crime. One does not exclude the other, but the two are organically related. As Fyodor Dostoyevsky argued, without sin there is no sanctity. This prominent writer was sentenced to hard labor for his opposition activity in the socialist organization of the Petrashevsky Circle (an association of liberal intellectuals founded in St. Petersburg by Mikhail Petrashevsky), which Dostoyevsky joined in 1847 to discuss utopian socialist ideas. He was, therefore, a political prisoner. However, in prison he became fascinated by common criminals, coming from the common people, and from this fascination arose to a large extent his conservatism. Thus, this Christian writer, author of “Crime and Punishment”, based his orthodox worldview on understanding towards criminals, who may deserve punishment, but who, if they repent, can attain sainthood. In “The House of the Dead: Memoirs of the Prison,” Dostoevsky admitted that the common Russian people called criminals “wretches.”

Russians are tolerant of human weaknesses, sympathetic to violence in the broad sense, which is not only an inherent element of their life, but also an important part of their mentality and culture. It is no accident that Putin boasts of having been “raised in the courtyards of Leningrad”, where he learned the rule that “if the fight is inevitable, you must strike first”. It is also no coincidence that after the terrorist attack on the Crocus City Hall shopping mall on the outskirts of Moscow, videos went viral on the Internet showing a security officer cutting off the ear of one of the detained perpetrators. Russians do not expect justice. They expect bloody revenge. They expect to respond to violence with violence.

You talk about despotic Russia, how does it manifest itself and how does it maintain power within the country? Is there a Russian opposition?

Despotism has a centuries-old tradition in Russia. The brief periods of relative democratization are remembered today as times of sadness, so called “smuta”, confusion, chaos and crisis of the state, which in the collective consciousness must be strong. The last “smuta” was the end of the 20th century, today known as “the lousy 90s”. The reforms carried out after the disintegration of the USSR were supposed to bring democracy and capitalism. Instead, President Boris Yeltsin came to power, who spoke with liberal grandiloquence, but first dissolved the Parliament by force and then won re-election with the money of the oligarchs, on whom he then became dependent. And it was precisely the oligarchs who were the only real beneficiaries of the changes. Well, perhaps apart from the criminals: the famous Russian mafia was then experiencing its renaissance. On the threshold of the 21st century, the Russians, tired of the “smuta”, once again wanted a heavy-handed government. Vladimir Putin adapted perfectly to these needs. He sent the oligarchs a message that went something like this: “The times of Yeltsin are over. If you want to continue making money, you must give up your political ambitions.” Those who did not heed this warning lost not only their fortunes, but also their freedom. It was not difficult to bribe them, since, in reality, no oligarchic fortune had been amassed in an entirely legal manner.

Putin also pacified the media owned by the oligarchs, but the democratic opposition continued to operate in Russia for years, sometimes bringing thousands of people to the streets (but only of larger cities). The Kremlin enacted successive repressive laws, labeling its opponents “foreign agents.” And as for his most important rivals, Putin did not allow them to participate in the elections. However, in order to maintain the appearance of democracy, he resorted to the services of “technical candidates” or “spoiler candidates”, who pretended to be opponents and proclaimed their slogans, but in reality had the mission of taking votes away from them and weakening them politically. In the Parliament there is the so-called concessionary opposition, i.e. parties which in reality do not differ much from the presidential party United Russia or even proclaim more radical slogans than the latter. The more it clashed with the West, the more it oppressed the opposition, until it finally virtually eliminated it after the invasion of Ukraine. Today, Putin’s real opponents are exiled, in prison or dead, like the Kremlin ruler’s greatest enemy, Alexei Navalny.  

After more than three and a half years of Russian invasion in Ukraine, is Russia achieving its goals? How do you see the future of the region?

It should be remembered that Russia’s goal is not to obtain concrete territorial concessions. Donald Trump does not understand this fact. The American president cannot understand why Putin does not want (at least for now) to freeze the war on the current front line and, de facto, to separate from Ukraine a large part of the territories he considers his own. Russia announced its strategic objectives first by an ultimatum to NATO and the US at the end of 2021, and then by announcing the start of a “special military operation.” The aim of the latter was “demilitarization” and “denazification”, which, translated from propaganda language into normal language, means the liquidation of the Ukrainian state in its current form (considered fascist by Moscow). In other words: it is not a question of cutting Ukraine, but of submitting it completely to Russia. For its part, the ultimatum addressed to the West was reduced to demanding the withdrawal of any kind of NATO activity in Central Europe, from the countries that joined the alliance in 1999 and later. The objectives were thus as follows: Ukraine was to be Russian, and the area between Ukraine and Germany was to be a gray buffer zone, devoid of Western protection. Fortunately, for the time being there is nothing to indicate that Moscow is capable of achieving these goals. In other words, nothing indicates that Russia will win the war outright. For its part, Ukraine is fighting for two goals. The first is to maintain its independence and the second is to regain lost territories. The first has already been achieved. At the moment, there is no chance of achieving the second. I see the future of the region as follows: Russia will not accept an end to the war that is not a clear victory for it and a clear defeat for Ukraine. Nor will it agree to freeze the conflict. Therefore, the war will continue.

In the West, countries like Hungary believe that negotiations with Russia can and should take place. Does it make sense to negotiate with Russia and how can peace negotiations end?

There are two ways to end the war: defeat the enemy and bring him to capitulation, or negotiate peace. The former is not possible, so the latter must be tried. However, for now, all negotiations on the part of Russia are just a game of appearances or a way to buy time. Moscow sits at the table, but imposes prohibitive conditions that offend the intelligence of its opponents (and anyone following the “peace” process). Trump’s attempts have yielded no results. So, instead of the carrot, now the stick is needed in the form of the most severe sanctions possible and the largest possible military and financial aid to Kyiv.

However, there is another key issue that almost no one pays attention to. Putin puts the matter more or less like this, “we don’t want a cease-fire.” “Why beat around the bush? Let’s talk straight about peace.” Unfortunately, Trump, naive as a child, accepted this perspective. It is a trap. Peace means war – why? Simple. Russia’s demands are so exaggerated that the peace process will drag on for a long time. If a cease-fire were established during negotiations, people would stop dying. But then the front line would shift neither to the west nor to the east. However, if there is no truce, but peace negotiations, Putin can kill two birds with one stone: first, he can pretend that he cares about peace (after all, negotiations continue!), and, secondly, since the actions on the front line do not stop, he can invade more Ukrainian territories in the meantime. The more territory it occupies, the greater the part of Ukraine that will belong to it after the war and, what is even more serious, the greater the possibility that Ukraine, as a state, will capitulate or simply cease to exist. Or, alternatively, that Putin will succeed in occupying all of Ukraine. In short, Russia must be forced to declare a cease-fire so that, firstly, people will stop dying and, secondly, so that Russian troops will be forced to stop.

Russia’s influence is also visible in the Middle East and South America. What measures is the Putin regime taking there?

Especially after February 24, 2022, Russia is turning to Asia and the Global South. They are natural allies in the war against the West. I would answer “philosophically” that Putin’s long-term goal is to replace the “unipolar world”, where the only pole is the West, with a “multipolar world”. Sounds like a dream of geopolitical pluralism. What’s wrong with that, instead of Washington’s diktat, we have to deal with multiple sovereign poles? The problem is that those poles are not small or medium-sized nations, but regional powers that grant themselves the right to imperialistic practices. This is a direct reference to Nikolai Danilovsky’s 19th century theory of the plurality of civilizations. This Russian thinker considered that the Germanic-Romanic (i.e., Western) civilization was not the only valid one. He mentioned many other equivalent civilizations, among which was Slavic, i.e., Russian. Returning more directly to the question: Russia wants to be at the forefront of the anti-Western international, side by side with Asia, Africa or Latin America, wielding an anti-colonial discourse (actually, left-wing, which may surprise many naive people who consider Moscow as a bastion of the right).  

In Poland, part of the society and the political circle is pushing for a resolution of the Volhynian massacre issue and there are certain negative feelings. Do you think it is a good time to resolve the issue? Who will benefit from all this?

There was never a “good time” to resolve the Volhynia issue. At first it was said that it was too early, because Ukraine was a young country, so we had to wait for it to mature and understand for itself the mistakes of the past. And when the war broke out, the next excuse for silence was: “now you can’t, because Ukraine is fighting for its survival”. And when the war is over, another “reason” will be found. If Kyiv would not hinder the exhumation of Polish victims of the Volhynian genocide, it would deprive its critics of many arguments. Russia would lose a tool to confront Kyiv with Warsaw. Also, let’s not be naive: Ukraine will not lose the war if it makes ANY gestures towards the victims of Volhynia.

Moreover, Ukraine will not lose the war if it condemns the genocide committed almost a hundred years ago by Ukrainian nationalists. Poland cannot compromise on this issue. Facilitating exhumations is a minimum condition, because it is about respect for the victims, i.e. the foundations of humanity. For its part, Poland must insist firmly and on every occasion: Volhynia was a heinous crime committed against innocent Polish civilians by those whom, unfortunately, Kyiv often regards as its heroes. Raising the Volhynia issue will benefit Poland. Ignoring the issue will benefit Russia, as it will give it arguments to sow discord between Poland and Ukraine. It is Ukraine that is fighting for its survival, not Poland. Therefore, it would be absurd for Poland to give up defending its interests, something that will not cause the sudden collapse of Ukraine.

In many Western countries there are people who see Russia as a bastion of conservative values. What do you think about that? And what are those values?

First of all, Russian historical policy worships the communist Red Army. Secondly, Russia ranks among the world’s top (third, behind the Maldives and Kazakhstan) in terms of the number of divorces per 1000 inhabitants (although it should be noted that this is also related to the relatively liberal attitude of the Orthodox Church). Thirdly, in Russia there is a very liberal abortion law (abortion is possible up to the 12th week of pregnancy, for social reasons up to the 24th week and for health reasons up to the end of pregnancy). Even pro-abortion propaganda is banned only at the regional level (entities of the Russian Federation). Putin, who is not afraid to ban many things, does not fight against abortion. Either he does not want to irritate a society degenerated by liberal legislation on abortion, or he simply does not care that his subjects massively and unhindered kill unborn children. Fourth, Russia is a multicultural, multinational, multiethnic and multireligious state. Alongside the formally dominant Orthodox Church, Islam is of enormous and growing importance. In Europe, Muslims constitute an immigrant or refugee population. In Russia, Muslims belong to the indigenous population. Ideas about a “white, conservative, European and Slavic” Russia are therefore tales for the naive. Fifth and finally, there is no tradition of private property in Russia. Collectivism, anti-individualism and the custom of the state playing a leading role in the economy predominate. Is this what a conservative state looks like? I leave the answer to the readers.

Earlier you mentioned the cult of the Red Army, a cult that has also been extended to Stalin. Why? What is Putin’s attitude towards the Soviet Union?

Putin called the disintegration of the USSR the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. It is worth paying attention to the word “geopolitical”. For him, the catastrophe was not the collapse of the communist system, but the disintegration of a great empire stretching westward. Russian historical politics is syncretic. It venerates everything that relates to the greatness of the state abroad, to its imperial power. It does not matter whether the state is red, white, pink or rainbow inside. The important thing is that it expands its borders. That is why Putin does not sympathize with Lenin, who is associated with revolution, i.e. with chaos, with the destruction of the great State, but also with internationalism, while he respects Stalin, who established “order”, strengthened the State (or rather its power structures) and built a powerful empire. Putin accuses Lenin of having created the Ukrainian state. The point is that Lenin, in creating the Soviet Union, was determined that formally independent national republics, including the Ukrainian one, should be created within it. Stalin did not incorporate these republics into Russia, but he controlled them more tightly, repressed centrifugal tendencies and recreated the traditions of the old Tsarist Russia. And that is why he is revered by Russians. For years, in successive polls, the “Red Tsar” has been singled out by Russian society as the most outstanding man in history. Stalin embodies the ideal of a ruler: he was stern but strong, he repressed the “corrupt” elites, he won the war… And that he also murdered millions of innocent people? Never mind, the important thing is that he built a powerful state.

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